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FLASH OF THE TITANS:
A PICTURE OF SECTION 301 IN THE DISPUTE
BETWEEN KODAK AND FUJI AND A VIEW
TOWARD DISMANTLING ANTICOMPETITIVE
PRACTICES IN THE JAPANESE
DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM
Frank J. Schweitzer

INTRODUCTION
The bilateral trading relationship between the United States and Japan
prevails as one of the most important in the world today. As such,
frequent trade disputes, not surprisingly, arise between the two economic
superpowers.' The latest battle pits Eastman Kodak Company ("Kodak")

against Fuji Photo Film Co., Ltd. ("Fuji"). The stakes are substantial.
Kodak alleges $5.6 billion in lost profits and seeks fair access to the
Japanese film markee valued at $13.7 billion.! In such trade disputes,
* Associate, International Trade Group, Dewey Ballantine. This paper was written prior to my association with Dewey Ballantine, as part of the degree requirements
for an LL.M. at Georgetown University. The views, opinions and representations contained in this paper are my own and do not necessarily reflect those of either Eastman Kodak Company or Dewey Ballantine. This paper is for my parents for their
guidance and for my wife, Jeannie, for her enduring support and encouragement.
1. The U.S. and Japan are presently engaged in trade rows in the aviation,
construction and insurance sectors. The recent rift over renewal of the 1991 Semiconductor Agreement was only recently resolved by way of a new accord.
2. Kodak Welcomes Investigation, Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 12, at 1128 (July
5, 1995). This trade dispute is not Kodak's first engagement with the color film
industry in Japan. The United States charged Japanese companies with dumping color
negative photographic and chemical components in the United States. The International
Trade Administration of the Department of Commerce made a preliminary ruling that
there was dumping, with margins of 321% to 360% on Fuji photographic paper sold
in the United States. The investigation ceased following a suspension agreement
reached with Fuji Photofilm B.V. Ltd., Fuji Japan, and Konica Inc. Id.
3. The "film market" as used throughout this paper refers to both the Japanese
consumer photographic film and consumer photographic paper markets.
4. Ben Dobbin, Motorola's Strategic Ace Takes on Japan as Kodak CEO, L.A.
TIM S, Aug. 8, 1995, at D6.
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the use by the United States of Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974
("Section 301"),' sometimes called the "nuclear weapon" 6 of the trade
world, often proves controversial.
Section 301 authorizes the United States Trade Representative

("USTR") to take action against any "act, policy or practice" 7 of a foreign country that is "inconsistent with" or "denies benefits" to the United States under international trade agreements,8 or that is "unjustifiable
and burdens or restricts United States commerce." 9 Section 301 also
allows the USTR to take action where an act, policy or practice of a
foreign country is "unreasonable" and burdens or restricts United States
commerce."0 For example, Congress deemed the denial of "market opportunities" through "anticompetitive practices" "unreasonable."" Where
an international agreement does not cover the trade sector at issue, or
the purported anticompetitive practice constituting a trade barrier, the
United States can use the threat of Section 301 as an effective tool in
negotiations with foreign governments.'"
The United States exported over half a trillion dollars worth of goods
and service in 1993.' 3 The government expects that number to climb to

5. Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2411-2420, as amended §§301-310.
6. Julius L. Katz, former deputy U.S. Trade Representative in the Bush Administration, and the president of Hills & Co., a Washington international trade consulting
firm, said, "[It] is certainly useful as a threat and as a deterrent, but as with nuclear
weapons, once you have been compelled to use them, you have lost both the battle
and the war." Bruce Stokes, Collision Course, NAT'L J., Vol. 27, No. 33-34. In 1986,
during testimony before the Senate Committee on Finance, Ambassador Clayton
Yeutter, then U.S. Trade Representative, remarked that "Section 301 is the H-Bomb
of trade policy; and in my judgment, H-bombs ought to be dropped by the President
of the United States and not by anyone else." Judith Hippler Bello & Alan F. Homer, The Heart of the 1988 Trade Act. A Legislative History of the Amendments to
Section 301, AGGRESSIVE UNiLATERALISM (Jagdish Bhagwati & Hugh Patrick, eds.
1990) at 52, citing Presidential Authority to Respond to Unfair Trade Practices:
Hearing on Title 1I of S. 1860 and S. 1862 Before the Senate Committee on Finance,
99th Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1986).
7. Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2411(a)(1)(B).
8. Id. § 2411(a)(1)(B)(i).
9. Id. § 2411(a)(1)(B)(ii).
10. Id. § 2411(b)(1).
11. Id. § 2411(d)(3)(B)(i)(V).
12. Alan 0. Sykes, Constructive Unilateral Threats in International Commercial
Relations: The Limited Case For Section 301, 23 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 263, 316
(1991-92).
13. David A. Gantz, A Post-Uruguay Round Introduction To International Trade
Law In The United States, 12 ARJz J. INT'L & COMP. L. 1, 1 (1995), citing Message
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$1.2 trillion by the year 2000.'" Consequently, great political pressure
exists to use Section 301 to afford U.S. industries fair and meaningful
access to foreign markets presently laden with trade barriers."5 Section
301 persists as a resonating voice in trade diplomacy. Critics often proclaim it a rogue instrument when it is used to address the acts, practices
and policies of foreign governments which Congress deems "unreasonable," even if they do
not violate United States' rights under internation16
al trade agreements.
This paper focuses on the discretionary use of Section 301 in response to Kodak's claim of denied access to the Japanese film market
because of "unreasonable" acts of the Japanese Government in its "toleration" of anticompetitive trade practices by Fuji. In addition, this paper
considers the utility of Section 301 in response to private trade barriers
which fall outside the scope of international trade agreements, and the
prospects of summoning Section 301 in future trade disputes with Japan.
I. SECTION 301 OF THE TRADE ACT OF 1974, AS AMENDED
A. Focus ON JAPAN
Section 301, enacted by Congress with the intent to open foreign
markets to United States exports, was
pursued by exceptionally aggressive means, a product of the egregious
trade imbalance and frustration at foreign unfairness, real and perceived.
And its most important single target was Japan. The administration

From the President Transmitting the Uruguay Round Trade Agreements to the U.S.

Congress, H.R. Doc. 316, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1994). United States goods and
services exported in 1993 were in excess of $660 billion, representing more than ten
percent of the United States gross domestic product. Id.
14. Jeffrey E. Garten, Is America Abandoning Multilateral Trade?, FOREIGN AFF.,

Nov.-Dec. 1995, at 50, 52.
15. Gantz, supra note 13, at 1I1.
Between 1975 and February 1994, the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative
initiated a total of ninety-one [Section 301] investigations. Of these, forty were

terminated by the USTR--usually after the conclusion of an agreement with the
respondent country-eighteen resulted in retaliation through the denial of trade
benefits, and the rest were suspended, withdrawn, or resolved through on-going
negotiations. Id.
See Thomas 0. Bayard and Kimberly Ann Elliott, RECwRoCrrY AND RETALATION IN
U.S. TRADE Policy, 355-465 (1994) (providing a summary table and case summaries
of the ninety-one Section 301 cases filed through 1994).

16. See Bello & Homer, supra note 6.

AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y

[VOL.

11:5

worked, for policy and political reasons, to spread the pain among countries, but there was no doubt which country Congress had most in
mind. 7
Analysts deemed Section 301 a matter of "export politics."' 8 This
law starkly contrasts with almost all other United States trade remedies,
which are designed to protect United States markets from increasing
imports and unfair foreign competition. 9 One author labeled the policy
rationale forming the foundation of Section 301 "aggressive
unilateralism."'2 A former Vice Minister of International Trade in Japan, in referring to Section 301, commented that "the U.S. uses its own
criteria to determine unfairness, prosecutes the case itself, and hands
down the sentence."'" Notwithstanding this perception of the United
States as prosecutor, judge and executioner, it should be noted that
Japan wields its own version of Section 301. The Japanese counterpart
to the U.S. law provides the Japanese Government with the authority to
impose additional duties on products from a foreign country that discriminates against Japanese goods, shipping, or airlines.22
B. OVERVIEW OF SECTION 301

The USTR controls the proceedings under Section 301 from start to
finish, subject to any direction of the President.' The USTR retains the
discretion to decide whether it will undertake an investigation and to
determine what terms, if any, of Section 301 apply and, if so, whether

17. I.M. Destler, AMERICAN TRADE POLITICS, 127 (3d. ed. 1995).
18. Id.
19. Gantz, supra note 13, at 13.
20. Jagdish Bhagwati, Aggressive Unilateralism: An Overview, in AGGRESSIVE
UNILATERALISM 11 (Jagdish Bhagwati & Hugh Patrick, eds. 1990). Jagdish Bhagwati
coined the phrase.
21. Makota Kurada, We've Had Enough of John Wayne, INT'L EcON., Nov.-Dec.
1988, at 67, quoted in BREAKING NEw GROUND IN U.S. TRADE POLICY: A STATEMENT By THE RESEARCH AND POLICY COMMITTEE OF THE COMMITTEE FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 52 (Westview Press 1991).
22. Mrrsuo MATSUSHITA & THOMAS J.SCHOENBAUM, JAPANESE INTERNATIONAL
TRADE AND INVESTMENT LAw 89 (1989). One can find the law in Article 7 of the
Customs and Tariff Law. Id. The European Union also has a version of Section 301.
The measure is found in Council Regulation 2641/84. Wolfgang W. Leirer, Retaliatory
Action In United States And European Trade Law: A Comparison Of Section 301 Of
the Trade Act of 1974 And Council Regulation 2641184, 20 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM.
REG. 495 (1995).
23. Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2411-2420.
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to retaliate and what form the retaliation should take."' Countries confronted with a Section 301 investigation have the option to settle the
dispute with the United States or face retaliatory measures.'
1. Investigation By The USTR
Any interested person may file a petition with the USTR requesting
that it take action under Section 301.' The USTR reviews the allegations and determines within 45 days after receipt of the petition whether
or not to initiate an investigation."
The USTR may self-initiate an investigation after consulting with
appropriate private sector advisory committees.'h On July 3, 1995, the
USTR announced that it would investigate the alleged anticompetitive
business practices in the Japanese film market." The USTR has up to
one year to conclude the investigation and make a determination.?
2. Mandatory Action Under Section 301
Under Section 301, if the USTR determines that a foreign country
act, policy, or practice "violates, or is inconsistent with" a "trade
agreement," to which the United States is a party" or is "unjustifiable
and burdens or restricts U.S. commerce,"32 then the USTR takes "mandatory" action, subject to any specific direction of the President, to
enforce the American trade agreement rights or to obtain the elimination
of the act, policy or practice. Section 301, however, does not require the
USTR to take action in certain instances.33 With respect to the manda-

24. UL § 241 1(c).

25. Id. § 2411(a)(2)(B).
26. Id. § 2412(a)(1).
27. Id. § 2412(b).
28. Id. In addition, the statute requires public notice of determinations. Trade Act
of 1974, 19 U.S.C. §2412(a)(4). The statute requires publication of a summary of the
petition and an opportunity for the presentation of views, including a public hearing if
timely requested by the petitioner or any interested person, in the case of decisions to
initiate an investigation. Id.
29. Acting On Kodak Complaint, USTR To Investigate Japanese Film Market,
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 12, at 1128 (July 5, 1995).
30. Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2414(a)(2)(B).

31. Id. § 2411(a)(1)(B).
32. Id. § 2411(a)(1)(B)(ii).
33. Id. § 2411(a)(2). The statute does not require the USTR to take action if the
Dispute Settlement Body of the World Trade Organization adopts a report or issues a
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tory action provision, Kodak alleges violations of the Organization for

Economic Cooperation and Development Code of Liberalization of Capital Movements and the United States-Japan Friendship, Commerce and
Navigation Treaty.34
Section 301 is perhaps most justifiable when used to protect rights of
the United States under international agreements.35 The policing of international agreements and the Kodak allegations of treaty violations,
however, are not the subject of this paper. Rather, the paper considers
Kodak's allegations of the anticompetitive practices of Fuji amounting to
unfair trade practices under the Japanese Antimonopoly Act, and the
toleration by the Japanese Government of those practices, even though
they may not per se violate any United States' rights under international
trade agreements.
3. Discretionary Action Under Section 301
If the USTR determines that the act, policy or practice is "unreasonable or discriminatory and burdens or restricts United States commerce" 36 and requires action by the United States, the USTR has dis-

ruling that countries have not violated U.S. trade agreement rights Id. In addition, the
USTR need not act if the foreign government has agreed to an imminent solution to
the burden or restriction on U.S. commerce, or has agreed to provide satisfactory
trade benefits; or where the USTR finds, in "extraordinary cases," that action would
have an adverse impact on the economy of the United States substantially out of
proportion to the benefits of action, or finds that action would cause serious harm to
the national security of the United States. Id.
34. Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation, Apr. 2, 1953, U.S.-Japan, 4
U.S.T. 2063.
35. See Sykes, supra note 12, at 269-91.
36. Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. §2411(b)(1). The Act defines "unreasonable" to
include the following:
(3)(A) An Act, policy, or practice is unreasonable if the act, policy while not
necessarily in violation of, or inconsistent with, the international legal rights of
the United States, is otherwise unfair and inequitable.
(B) Acts, policies, and practices that are unreasonable include, but are not limited to any, act, policy, or practice, or any combination of acts, policies, or
practices, which(i)denies fair and equitable
(I) opportunities for the establishment of an enterprise,
(II) provision of adequate and effective protection of intellectual property
rights notwithstanding the fact that the foreign country may be in compliance with the specific obligations of the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights referred to in section 3511(d) of this
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cretion to take all "appropriate and feasible action,"' subject to the
specific direction, if any, of the President, to obtain "the elimination of
the act, policy or practice."3' Congress vests the USTR with the discretion to determine whether action under Section 301 would be effective
in addressing the petitioner's grievance.39
4. Negotiating With Japan And Section 301 Looming Overhead
Section 301 requires the USTR to initiate consultations with the foreign government on the same date that an investigation is initiated.
Recently, high profile bilateral disputes with Japan have taken a predictable pattern in which "Japan appears intransigent and defensive and
doesn't move. America demands major changes ... An eleventh-hour
deal is reached."' Foreign governments, however, need not negotiate
with the United States if they consider the costs of settling the dispute
to be greater than the imposed retaliatory measures.
The Japan External Trade Organization published a report in which
they criticized the "U.S. tendency to resort to policies and measures
based on unilateral judgments [in which] determinations under Section

title,

(III) nondiscriminatory market access opportunities for United States persons that rely upon intellectual property protection, or
(IV) market opportunities, including the toleration by a foreign government of systematic anticompetitive activities by enterprises or among
enterprises in the foreign country that have the effect of restricting, on a
basis that is inconsistent with commercial considerations, access of United
States goods or services to a foreign market,
(ii) constitutes export targeting, or
(iii) constitutes a persistent pattern of conduct that(I) denies workers the right of association,
(I) denies workers the right to organize and bargain collectively,
(II) permits any form of forced or compulsory labor,
(IV) fails to provide a minimum age for the employment of children, or
(V) fails to provide standards for minimum wages, hours of work, and
occupational safety and health of workers.
Trade Act of 1974, § 301(d), 19 U.S.C. § 2411(d)
37. Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. §2411(b)(2).
38. Id.

39. Id. § 2411.
40. Id. § 2413(a).
41. Comments of Commerce Undersecretary for International Trade Jeffrey
Garten, Garten Proposes New Framework In Trade Negotiations With Japan, Int'l

Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 12, at 1312 (Aug. 2, 1995).
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301 are made unilaterally by the United States, and recipients are without recourse to dispute settlement procedures provided in international
agreement."'42 In the Kodak-Fuji dispute, the Japanese Government insists that it will not negotiate with the United States under the threat of
unilateral trade sanctions and would prefer to use multilateral mechanisms, such as the World Trade Organization, the U.S.-Japan Framework
for a New Economic Partnership talks, or the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development.43
5. Retaliation And Proportionality
The power of Section 301 lies in its ability to deny access to the
United States market. Upon the determination that retaliation is appropriate, the USTR may only impose sanctions affecting goods or services of
the foreign country. These sanctions must be equivalent in value to the
burden or restriction imposed by that country on United States commerce.' Section 301 authorizes the USTR to take several types of ac-

tions.45 The USTR must make any action, taken pursuant to Section
301, consistent with United States obligations under international agreements.'

42. INDUSTRIAL STRUCTURAL COUNCIL, 1993 REPORT ON UNFAIR TRADE POLICIES
BY MAJOR TRADING PARTNERS 19 (Jetro 1993).
43. Fuji Officials Deny Kodak Charges of Japanese Trade Barriers For Film,
Int'l Trade Daily (BNA) (Aug. 1, 1995). See International Trade, U.S., Japan Begin
Discussion on Kodak Section 301 Petition, INT'L TRADE DAILY (BNA) (Oct. 6, 1995)
(noting that the Japanese Government has stated it prefers the World Trade Organization forum to handle the dispute).
44. Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 241 1(a)(3).
45. Id. The USTR can (1) suspend, withdraw, or prevent the application of benefits of trade agreement concessions to carry out a trade agreement with the foreign
country involved; (2) impose duties or other import restrictions on the goods of, and
notwithstanding any other provision of law, fees or restrictions on the services of, the
foreign country for such time as the USTR deems appropriate, Trade Act of 1974,
§301(c)(1)(B), 19 U.S.C. §2411(c)(1)(B); (3) withdraw or suspend preferential duty
treatment under certain U.S. trade agreements, Trade Act of 1974, §301(c)(1)(C), 19
U.S.C. §2411(c)(1)(C); or (4) enter into binding agreements that commit the foreign
country to eliminate or phase out, the act, policy or practice which burdens or restricts U.S. commerce, Trade Act of 1974, §301(c)(1)(D), 19 U.S.C. §2411(c)(1)(D);
or provide the United States with compensatory trade benefits that are satisfactory to
the USTR. Id.
46. Id. If the USTR determines that its action will be in the form of import
restrictions, it must give preference to tariffs over other forms of import restrictions.
It must also consider substituting, on an incremental basis, an equivalent duty for any
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C. SECTION 301 AND THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION
U.S. obligations under the Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization ("WTO"),47 influence Section 301 and the statute incorpo-

rates by reference the Dispute Settlement Body of the WTO. In the
past, the filing of GATT complaints became part of the Section 301
process. The statute, however, did not require the United States to wait

for the final results of GATTC dispute resolution proceedings before
taking unilateral action."' The Uruguay Round debate centrally focused

other form of import restriction imposed. Any action with respect to export targeting
must reflect, to the extent possible, the full benefit level of the targeting over the
period during which the action taken has effect. Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C.
§2411(c)(5).
47. Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Final Act Embodying
the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations. Apr. 14. 1995,
reprinted in H.R. Doc. 316, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 1326 (1994).
48. Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2411(a)(2)(A). Section 303 requires the
United States to exercise international procedures for dispute resolution. These international mechanisms must proceed parallel to the domestic investigation. The same day
that the USTR makes its determination, it must initiate an investigation and request
consultations with the foreign country concerned, regarding the involved issues. The
USTR may ask to delay its request for up to 90 days in order to verify or improve
the petition to ensure an adequate basis for consultation. Should consultations with the
foreign government fail and the dispute involves issues covered by a trade agreement,
the agreement obligates the USTR to request formal dispute settlement under the
agreement before the earlier of the close of that consultation period or 150 days after
the beginning of the consultation. The USTR must seek information and advice from
the petitioner, and from appropriate private sector advisory committees in preparing
presentations for consultations and dispute settlement proceedings. Trade Act of 1974.
§ 303, 19 U.S.C. § 2413. When a Section 301 investigation begins, the U.S. government undertakes consultations with the foreign government of the involved country.
These negotiations take place at the WTO headquarters in Geneva when the alleged
violations relate to GATT 1994 or any of the Uruguay Round Agreements. Id.
49. G. Richard Shell, Trade Legalism And International Relations Theory: An
Analysis Of The World Trade Organization, 44 DUKE LJ. 829, 844 (1995). In the
past, under the GATT, when a GATT panel found a government's complaint concerning an alleged violation of GAT justifiable, the violating country could indefinitely
"block" adoption of the panel's report, leaving the dispute unresolved and the petitioning member of GATT without recourse. Id. That scenario changed as of January
1, 1995, with the implementation of the Uruguay Round Agreements. Countries found
violating GATT provisions are no longer able to "block" adverse panel reports. Id. In
addition, the Agreement now authorizes countries successful in bringing GAT claims
to withdraw Uruguay Round trade benefits from the violating country, if following
review by the Dispute Settlement Body or the Appellate Body of the WTO, the matter cannot be resolved in a satisfactory manner. Id. at 848-51.
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on this unilateral action. The debate appeared to produce "a general
desire by all nations to stem growing reliance on unilateral threats and
trade sanctions and replace this free-for-all with a stable dispute resolution system that could be relied on to eliminate protectionist trade
rules." '
The WTO agreements expanded coverage to other trade sectors including services, intellectual property protection, industrial goods and
agricultural goods."' No multilateral means, however, were crafted to
redress certain types of anticompetitive practices. Japan "continues to
practice highly managed trade that runs counter to the spirit of the
WTO."' 2 The Clinton Administration believes that
many of the barriers in Japan-lack of antitrust protection, interlocking
relations among companies that block entry by foreign firms, collusion
between suppliers and manufacturers, and suffocating regulations-are not
yet within the competence of the World Trade Organization, nor is there
a consensus on creating and enforcing rules to deal with them. 3
Although the WTO agreements do not contemplate such private barriers
to trade, the effectiveness of Section 301 remains in these areas. 4 An
examination of Japanese trade barriers, past and present, places the
present dispute between Kodak and Fuji in context and provides insight
into the dynamics of the bilateral trading relationship between the United States and Japan.
II. JAPANESE TRADE BARRIERS
A. HISTORICALLY

Commodore Matthew Perry landed his American fleet of warships in
Japan in July of 1853. Perry arrived not as a warrior, but as an envoy

50. Id. at 845.
51. See Gantz, supra note 13, at 18-21.
52. Jeffrey E. Garten, Is America Abandoning Multilateral Trade?, FOREIGN AFF.,

Nov.-Dec. 1995, at 50.
53. Id. at 55.
54. Aubry D. Smith, Bringing Down Private Barriers-An Assessment Of The
United States' Unilateral Options: Section 301 Of The 1974 Trade Act And Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Antitrust Law, 16 MICH. J. INT'L L. 241, 284 (1994).

"[T]he scope for retaliation not authorized within the GATr is greatly reduced, but
the private barriers potentially attacked with Section 301 are not correspondingly reduced; the reduction in unilateral means of securing market liberalization has not been

matched with an increase in multilateral means to achieve the same ends." Id.
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with a request from the United States Government that Japan open its
borders to commerce." In the feudal era, the Japanese perceived the
invitation to engage in commerce as a prelude to control of Japan by
foreign powers. 6 Japan, however, opened itself briefly to commerce but
then slowly closed and remained shut to world trade for the most part
until after World War Ifl
Following World War II, trade barriers in Japan consisted of foreign
exchange allocations and other quantitative restrictions.' The Japanese
Government primarily concerned itself with the protection and promotion
of indigenous industry5 Japan forged this objective in the face of severe foreign exchange shortages.' The Japanese Government accomplished its objective by placing restrictions on both the type and amount
of imports, in addition to the number of importers.6 ' These restrictions
impacted imports of raw materials, finished products and advanced technology. 2 "Allocation of foreign exchange for imports competing with
the products of the infant industries in their development throes as well
as for luxury goods was severely restricted."
This highly effective system of foreign exchange allocations and
import quotas formed the center of Japan's protectionist policy until the
early 1960's.' 4 Following Japan's accession to the IMF in 1952 and
GATT in 1955, import quotas dropped significantly' which forced Japan to turn to other barriers, including tariffs.' During the 1960's and
1970's Japan imposed higher tariffs than those imposed by either the
United 67States or the Member States of the European Economic Community.

55. MALCOLM KENNEDY, A SHORT HISTRY OF JAPAN, 131-38 (1963).
56. MATSUSHrrA & SCHOENBAUM, supra note 22, at iii.
57. Id
58. Motoshige Itoh & Kazuhara Kiyono, Foreign Trade and Direct Investment, in
INDUSTRIAL POLICY OF JAPAN, 155, 158-60, 166-67 (Ryutaro Komiya et al. eds.,
1988), reprinted in YUKIO YANAGIDA Er AL, LAW AND INvEsThNT IN JAPAN:
CASES AND MATEPALS, 189-91 (1994) [hereinafter YANAGIDA].
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. YANAGIDA, supra note 58, at 189.

64.
65.
66.
67.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Japan's rising trade surplus sparked world-wide criticism of its trade
practices and resulted in trade tensions with the United States with respect to certain industries, including textiles, color televisions, iron and
steel. 8 This criticism forced Japan to remove its trade barriers more
quickly during the late 1960s and early 1970s. 9 The items affected by
trade liberalization included color film in 1971. 7" "The indigenous industries on the way to growth were thus protected for quite a long
time."'"
B. TRADE BARRIERS TODAY
In general, foreign trade barriers to the United States include five
groups:72 formal,73 regulatory, 74 strategic, business and cultural. To-

68. YANAGIDA, supra note 58, at 189.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 190.
72. K. Blake Thatcher, Comment, Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974: Its
Utility Against Alleged Unfair Trade Practices by the Japanese Government, 81 NW.
J. INT'L L. & Bus. 492, 495, n.205 (1987) citing, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., MARKET
AccEss IN JAPAN: THE UNITED STATES EXPERIENCE, No. 85-37, at CRS 8-9 (1985)

indicating that:
Formal barriers include tariffs, quotas and investment controls; regulatory barriers include a broad range of regulatory practices that block or obstruct trade
such as product standards, government procurement, and customs approval;
strategic barriers include industrial policy and administrative guidance practices;
business barriers include aspects of the distribution system and business structure; and cultural barriers include buy-national attitudes.
Id.
73. Id. Section 301 petitions filed against formal trade barriers in Japan include
the following:
USTR Petition Regarding Japan Tobacco, No. 301-50, 50 Fed. Reg. 37,609
(1985) (tariffs on tobacco products); Petition of Semiconductor Indus. Ass'n,
No. 301-48, 50 Fed. Reg. 28,866 (1985) (past foreign investment restrictions
preventing entry of United States semiconductor firm into Japanese market and
past tariffs and quotas on semiconductor imports); Petition of Footware Indus.
of Am., Inc., No 301-36, 47 Fed. Reg. 56,428 (1982) (leather footware quota);
Petition of Associated Tobacco Mfrs., No. 301-12, 44 Fed. Reg. 19,083 (1979)
(import duties on pipe tobacco); Petition of Cigar Ass'n of Am., Inc., No. 30117, 44 Fed. Reg. 19,083 (1979) (import duties on cigar tobacco); Petition of
Tanners Council of Am., No. 301-13, 42 Fed. Reg. 42,413 (1977) (quantitative
restrictions of leather imports).
Id. at 519 n.206.
74. Id. In one case, the threat of filing a Section 301 petition was used as lever-
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day, it appears that the last two categories present the most difficulty for
American producers seeking entry to the Japanese market and, not surprisingly, form the heart of Kodak's Section 301 Petition. Current Japanese barriers include "investment barriers, buy-Japanese policies, legalized cartels, licensing restrictions, financial support for research and
'
development, and administrative guidance."75
1. Administrative Guidance
The phrase "administrative guidance" is not a legal term of art and it
appears nowhere in Japanese statutory law.7 6 "Administrative guidance
(gyrsei shid6) is a common Japanese regulatory technique that, although
generally nonbinding, seeks to conform the behavior of regulated parties
Informal regulation of Japanese
to broad administrative goals."
business, by way of administrative guidance, is an important aspect of
the government-business relationship to which Japanese companies show
great deference.'
Japanese businesses often prefer administrative guidance over formal
approaches which result in legal decisions because it "preserves the
important values ... of harmony and consensus between government
and industry." Inherent problems exist with administrative guidance,
such as the "arbitrary and capricious exercise of de facto governmental
power and the infringement of individual rights ... [as well as] the
lack of transparency of the process. '

age to compel Japan to modify its testing and certification procedures at American
factories. These methods consisted of unreasonable uncrating and destruction procedures. Id. at 527. The Semiconductor petition alleged that "the Japanese Government

had discriminated unreasonably against United States semiconductor manufacturers in
its procurement policies and that such discrimination had created a burden on United
States commerce." Id.
75. Id. at 528. See Garten, supra note 14, at 50 (discussing Japanese trade barriers).
76. MATSUSHiTA & SCHOENBAUM, supra note 22, at 31.
77. Michael K. Young, Judicial Review of Administrative Guidance:
Governmentally Encouraged Consensual Dispute Resolution in Japan, 84 COLUM. L
REV. 923, 926-32, reprinted in YANAGIDA, supra note 58, at 125.

78. Id.
79.

MATSUSHITA &

80. Id at 40-41.

SCHOENBAUM,

supra note 22, at 31.
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2. Keiretsu
Keiretsu8' are Japanese industrial or corporate groupings, which include two types: horizontal and vertical." "[A]s of 1983 the six major
horizontal keiretsu and their related companies accounted for 34 percent
of all corporate assets in Japan."83 Until World War II Japan had
zaibatsu, the predecessors to the keiretsu today, which consisted of early
forms of commercial and industrial combinations. s4 A typical zaibatsu,
often controlled by a single family, consisted of a central holding company which joined a bank, a trading company and several industries."
Japan, however, ordered these powerful combinations dissolved in the
wake of World War II and the United States occupation of Japan.86
While the zaibatsu formally dissolved, many of them continued to
work closely with one another and today three major horizontal keiretsu
trace their origin to zaibatsu that existed prior to World War 1I.87 The
other large horizontal keiretsu sprang from large banks: Fuji, DaiichiKangyo and Sanwa, which provided needed capital after the war.8 In
addition to a presence in the manufacturing sector, keiretsu are also
found in the Japanese distribution system. 9
3. The Distribution System In Japan
Many business executives agree that the complex distribution system
in Japan poses one of the most difficult barriers to the Japanese market.' Several million small stores coupled with some larger chains and
department stores, along with neighborhood and specialty shops form the
base of the Japanese retail system.9' One author described the distribution system as the most dramatic difference between the way the United

81. Id. The issue of keiretsu was one of the major areas of contention between
the United States and Japan during the Structural Impediments Initiative (SII) trade
discussions of 1989-1990. Id.
82. YANAGIDA, supra note 58, at 83.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. See YANAGiDA, supra note 58, at 88 (noting that the Mitsubishi, Mitsu and
Sumitomo keiretsu each stem from an early zaibatsu). Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 110.
90. ID. at 2.
91.

MATSUSHITA & SCHOENBAUM, supra note 22, at 55-57.
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States and Japan do business.' An important consequence of the Japanese distribution system is that
the Japanese manufacturer is conditioned to a market situation where he
has a network of some fifty to five hundred primary wholesalers who are
exclusively his. Their livelihood depends on his ability to continue to
provide products that will compete successfully against rival chains of distributors. The distribution network is therefore an extension of the company itself,
and is of primary concern to the Japanese manufacturing compa93
ny.

Enactment of the Large Retail Store Law has protected the distribution system, by maintaining the status quo of the thousands of smaller
mom and pop shops which dominate the Japanese commercial landscape.94 The nature of the distribution system poses several obstacles to
foreign firms attempting to sell their products, including the limitations
inherent in the capacity of small stores, the long-term business and
personal relationships that the Japanese value and the added costs of
multiple layers of wholesalers and processors.95 Furthermore, "[r]ebates
are commonly paid [by manufacturers] on the basis of the number of
goods sold in order to motivate wholesalers and retailers." Therefore,
the manufacturer must always consider the profit margin expectations of
wholesalers and retailers." In many sectors in Japan, manufacturers
control the distribution system which enables them to block the distribution and sale of imports.

92. YANAGIDA, supra note 58, at 104, citing MARK A. ZImTRm-AN, How To
Do BusINEsS wrrH THE JAPANESE: A STRATEGY FOR SuccEss 134-40 (1985).
93. Id. at 106.
94. Id. at 114-21 (discussing the Retail Stores Act).
95. MATSUSHITA & SCHOENBAUM, supra note 22, at 55-57. Matsushita and
Schoenbaum describe five major problem areas for foreign suppliers:
First, smaller stores, because of their limited space, tend to carry a limited selection of goods. Second, Japanese business people desire stable long-term business relationships in which a great deal of emphasis is placed upon human
relationships. Third, for many products there are several layers of wholesalers or
processors between the manufacturer and the retail levels, which tends to drive
up the prices of certain goods. Fourth, in Japan it is customary for wholesalers
and manufacturers to take back unsold goods. Fifth, marketing goods in Japan
usually requires the producer to employ a detail force to call on wholesalers
and retailers, establish personal relationships, and provide payments to enable
the retailer to display and sell products effectively.
Id. at 56.
96. Id.
97. Id.
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IS JAPAN DIFFERENT?

Japan imports a relatively small percentage of manufactured goods
from foreign countries, including the United States." In addition, Japanese corporations operating outside of Japan account for a substantial
share of all Japanese imports.' Imported products in Japan generally
cost more than in other countries and foreign investment in Japan tends
to be comparatively lower."° Japanese manufacturers and producers
outside of Japan favor buying materials, parts and components from
Japanese firms within Japan."'
A. THE REVISIONIST

The Japan "Revisionists" believe that a multilateral approach that
applies pressure coupled with reliance upon market-oriented trade measures will "not work in Japan, that Japanese trade does not respond to
macroeconomic adjustment pressures through exchange rates, and that
Japanese markets are not made more open through rules-oriented
negotiations."'" Those who favor such an approach to trade with
Japan believe that in the past "Japan only opened its markets when
confronted with external threats, be they Commodore Perry's black
ships, trade
retaliation, or international opprobrium as an unfair trading
', ' 3
partner.
Japanese private barriers are an important source of the trade deficit
with Japan. 4 Furthermore, Japanese trade barriers are viewed with
particular acrimony because of Japan's relatively free and unobstructed
access to the United States market." Japan is a "reactive state,"
whereby it engages in endless negotiation and will only offer conces-

98. AN AMERICAN TRADE STRATEGY: OPTIONS FOR THE 1990s 35 (Robert Z.
Lawrence & Charles L. Schultze eds., 1990) [hereinafter AN AMERICAN TRADE

STRATEGY].
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. THOMAS 0. BAYNARD & KIMBERLY ANN ELLIOTr, RECIPROCITY AND RETALIATION IN U.S. TRADE POLICY 33 (1994).
104. Id.
105. Id. Although many argue that this view does not consider U.S. barriers to
Japanese exports, including "voluntary" export restraints in the auto, steel and machine
tool industry. Id. at 33, n.8.
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sions when confronted with formidable pressure.' ° The so called
"trade hawks" look for results rather than liberalization concessions and
strive for actual increase in United States market share in foreign countries with barriers, creating a relationship with Japan based upon "managed trade."''"
The Revisionists suggest that the United States should adopt a different approach to trade with Japan, and that the Japanese market should
be opened without compromise." The proposition that import penetration in Japan remains very low and that, while after each successive
round of the GATT negotiations, import penetration increased in other
industrialized countries, it did not increase in Japan, supports this
view."° Low import penetration in the Japanese market relates directly
to business-government collusion, and as such, the U.S. Government
should challenge these restrictive arrangements."'

B. THE CRITICS OF THE UNILATERAL APPROACH
Critics contend the Revisionists exaggerate the "Japan problem" or
they fail to attribute the source of the problem to other factors, including those within the exclusive control of United States industry."'
They offer explanations for the trade deficit with Japan, and do not believe that it is "per se a detriment to the American economy."" Furthermore, they argue that it is difficult to see the benefit of the United
States acting unilaterally and excluding Japan, the world's second largest
market economy, from the global trading order without severely disabling that system."' In addition, they see cooperation between the
United States and Japan as a useful foil to European Union protectionism."4 They also maintain that benign reasons exist for the trade defi-

106. BAYNARD & ELLioTr, supra note 103, at 35.
107. See C.V. PRESTOWrz, TRADING PLACES: How WE ALLOWED JAPAN TO

50-70 (1988) (detailing the negotiation efforts to increase the market
share of U.S. companies in the Japanese semiconductor market).
108. Rudiger W. Dombusch, Policy Options for Freer Trade: The Case for Bilateralism, in AN AMERICAN TRADE STRATEGY, supra note 98, at 106, 120.
109. Id.

TAKE THE LEAD

110. Id.

111. See Sykes, supra note 12, at 303 (asserting that those factors impeding U.S.
sales to Japan include: language barriers, quality problems and marketing ineptitude on

the side of the United States).
112. I.M. DESTLER, AMICAN TRADE PoLrmCs 297 (3d. ed. 1995).
113. Id.
114. Id. The Japan Revisionist argue that the European Union would not make a
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cit, such as consumer loyalty to Japanese products and a corresponding
willingness to pay higher prices.
IV. ANALYSIS OF KODAK'S ANTICOMPETITIVE PRACTICES
ARGUMENT
A. SUMMARY
On May 18, 1995, Kodak filed a Section 301 petition"' alleging,
inter alia, that Fuji engages in "anticompetitive practices" which prevent
Kodak from fairly competing in the Japanese film market." 6 Kodak
asserts that the Japanese Government "tolerates" Fuji's denial of market
' 7
opportunities to Kodak, and, as such, its actions are "unreasonable."
Fuji counters that it has neither created an exclusionary market nor
engaged in any unfair trade practices."' Fuji claims that Kodak simply
exploits existing tensions between the United States and Japan and relies
on trade politics, rather than improving both its product design and
marketing in Japan." 9
B. DENIAL OF MARKET OPPORTUNITIES BY ANTICOMPETITIVE
PRACTICES
While Kodak alleges a host of violations and unlawful practices, the
essence of Kodak's petition focuses on the alleged exclusionary film
market in Japan, which Fuji has fashioned by way of its distribution
system. 2 Fuji's distribution engine allegedly consists of the following

suitable ally in the effort to pry open the Japanese market because of the E.U.'s
ambivalence about discriminating against Asia. Therefore, the United States should act
unilaterally to set targets for the growth rate of U.S. product market share in Japan.
Rudiger W. Dornbusch, Policy Options for Freer Trade: The Case for Bilateralism, in
AN AMERICAN TRADE STRATEGY, supra note 98, at 106, 120.
115. See Kodak Memorandum in Support of a Petition Filed Pursuant to Section
301 of the Trade Act of 1974, as amended, "Privatizing Protection: Japanese Market
Barriers in Consumer PhotographicFilm and Consumer Photographic Paper" (on file
with Office of U.S. Trade Representative) [hereinafter Kodak Petition]. But see "Rewriting History: Kodak's Revisionist Account of the Japanese Consumer Photographic
Market (on file with the Office of U.S. Trade Representative) (responding to the
Kodak Petition) [hereinafter Fuji Response].
116. Kodak Petition, supra note 115, at 75-147.
117. Id. at 184-239.
118. Fuji Response, supra note 115, at 61-106.
119. Id.
120. Kodak Petition, supra note 115, at 33-57.
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mechanisms: horizontal price coordination; "tatan" (retail and resale
price maintenance); rebates; and monitoring and discipline.' Kodak
alleges the foundation of Fuji's market structure is four primary wholesalers ("tokuyakuten")'" who distribute a single brand while colluding

with Fuji to perpetuate an exclusionary structure on lower levels of the
sales chain, all the way down to the retail level."

Fuji points out that it holds about a 10% market share of the United
States market and that Kodak maintains about the same share of the

Japanese market and attributes the respective market shares to consumer
identity with the national manufacturer in the respective countries.'
Fuji

maintains

that

Kodak

officials

never

raised

the

alleged

anticompetitive practices when they took place." Specifically, Fuji asserts that Kodak failed to bring these issues to the attention to the United States government during the Structural Impediments Initiative and
Framework negotiations. Kodak counters that when the Japanese disman-

fled formal trade barriers" in response to pressure from the U.S. Government and
"liberalization
anticompetitive
the expansion

the OECD, the Japanese Government implemented
countermeasures" which they "designed to create an
structure in the consumer photographic market and block
of Kodak's sales after liberalization of formal barri-

ers.' ' "VKodak buttresses this contention with a mountain of evidence.
121. Id. at 42-57.
122. Id. at 9. The four dealers are Asanuma, Kashimura, Misuzu and Omiya. Id.
The Kodak Petition states:
The term tokuyakuten (literally "special contract agent") is applied
throughout Japan's distribution system in reference to wholesalers with exclusive
distributive arrangements with manufacturers. In the photosensitive materials
industry, the term is used with respect to the four specialized wholesalers of
photographic products, Asanuma, Kashimura, Misuzu, and Omiya, who have
exclusive supply contracts with Fuji for consumer photographic film.
Id. at 16.
123. Kodak Petition, supra note 115, at 33-57.
124. Fuji Response, supra note 115, at 23-24. According to Fuji, Kodak failed in
its marketing operation in Japan by failing to focus on large retail outlets in large
Japanese cities, whereas Fuji attempts to visit as many shops as possible across Japan
with emphasis on personal assistance in sales promotion, advertising and individual
technical assistance. Id.
125. Fuji Response, supra note 115, at 3.
126. "After World War II, the Japanese Government prevented Kodak from achieving a significant presence in Japan by governmental mechanisms, including. high tariffs, import licensing requirements through 1971, and a prohibition on inward investment until 1976." Kodak Petition, supra note 115, at i.
127. Id. As one of its most touted pieces of evidence, Kodak quotes the action
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Fuji maintains that Kodak has not exhausted its local remedies and taken its case to the Japanese Government and the Fair Trade Commission.
With respect to the tokuyakuten and Fuji's distribution system, Fuji

maintains that its relationship with its four primary distributors dates
back to the founding of the company.' 28
Kodak maintains that the Fuji distribution system "remains in place
today with the complicity of the Japanese Government, and acts as a
continuing barrier to the expansion of Kodak's market presence."' 29
Kodak argues a lack of access to the four main wholesalers in the Japanese film market, the tokuyakuten that carry Fuji products on a single
brand basis,' prevents it from fairly competing in the Japanese market. Kodak asserts that access to the four main wholesalers remains an
"essential facility" in gaining access at the retail store level, and therefore, the Japanese consumers.'' Kodak maintains that Fuji purposefully
acted to cut off all of its competitors from the four primary wholesalers
as a "liberalization countermeasure" when Japan removed formal barriers
to trade.' 2 Kodak contends that the consolidation of the Japanese film

taken by MITI:
There is a fear that Kodak will control the Japanese market when the country
undergoes 100 percent capital liberalization; MITI thus plans to prepare with the
members of this industry a system which can counteract Kodak's global strategy. MITI, first of all, will thoroughly study Kodak's marketing strategies in
France, West Germany, and Great Britain, and then, based on this study, design
a countermeasure specifically for Japan . . .MITI has focused on the fact that
the film industry and the camera industry have experienced growth independently in Japan, but Kodak has combined these two industries as an inseparable
entity in launching its aggressive movement with respect to capital. MITI believes that if Japan also systematically intertwines the camera and film industries, the country will not easily yield to Kodak's global strategy . . . Upon
completion of the actual survey concerning the various European countries,
MITI will embark upon the designing of a viable system. If necessary, MITI
will request the involvement of the camera industry. The intention is for the
three parties-MITI, the film industry, and the camera industry-to work in
unison in solving this issue.
In Preparation of Capital Liberalization: MITI Also Examining Countermeasure,
NIlON SHASIN KOGYO TsusHIN, July 1, 1973, at 32, quoted in Kodak Petition,
supra note 115, at 14.
128. Fuji Response, supra note 115, at 8.
129. Kodak Petition, supra note 115, at i.
130. Id. at 33-42.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 85.
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distribution sector consisted of three major elements.' First, Kodak
maintains that the distribution relationships underwent a process called
"keiretsu-ka," in which formerly independent retailers, laboratories, and
wholesalers became the Fuji and Konica distribution keiretsu.' Next,
the existing system of rebates was changed to serve two goals: to enable
manufacturers to extract more cash from the distribution system and to
maintain and enhance the use of rebates as a means of controlling
wholesalers and retailers and excluding outsiders' products." Finally, a
"tokuyakuten bottleneck" was created between the film and camera
manufacturers on one side and secondary wholesalers and retailers on
the other side to enhance the controlling power of the tokuyakuten."
The touchstone of Kodak's position rests on its alleged inability to
build its own effective distribution base in Japan. Fuji contends that its
distribution system has evolved from "normal, market" driven forces."
In addition, Fuji maintains that it neither grants exclusive sales rights to
its distributors, nor prevents them from selling other brands of film."'
Fuji asserts that Kodak created its own distribution system by acquiring
several Japanese primary wholesalers and bringing them into the Kodak
family as Kodak Japan Ltd.'39 With regard to a rebate system, which
Kodak alleges is an elaborate scheme to keep tight control over its
distributors, Fuji asserts no grounds exist to support the allegations."
Even assuming the truth of Kodak's allegations, the purported
anticompetitive practices may not amount to violations of United States
antitrust laws. Keiretsu and other "vertical" arrangements between Japanese manufactures and distributors may not be actionable under U.S.
law.' However, such vertical relationships raise suspicion when they

133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

Id.
Kodak Petition, supra note 115, at 85.
Id.
Id.
Fuji Response, supra note 115, at 12.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 10-12.
Smith, supra note 54, at 259-60. While Section One of the Sherman Act

prohibits agreements, combinations, and conspiracies in restraint of trade, "[a]s a
nonprice vertical restraint, exclusive dealing is not a per se violation." Id. at 260. In
addition, as for horizontal keiretsu:
In terms of basic structure, the keiretsu generally seems to escape U.S. antitrust
law, at least when located abroad. The keiretsu is structured through cross-ownership and interlocking directorates. The relevant antitrust provision, Section 8
of the Clayton Act, applies to cross-ownership and interlocking directorates
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descend to the retail level. Some critical of lax U.S. Department of
Justice scrutiny in this area argue that "vertical boycotts, reciprocal
dealing, and exclusive dealing are examples of actionable arrangements
that might be practiced by keiretsu and which might impede exports."'42 Such vertical arrangements may constitute unfair trade practices under the Japanese Antimonopoly Act. 43
For purposes of Section 301 a foreign government's act, policy or
practice becomes "unreasonable," if while not necessarily inconsistent
with the international legal rights of the United States, it otherwise
remains unfair and inequitable.' In 1988, Congress expanded the orbit
of the definition of "unreasonableness" to include foreign government
toleration of anticompetitive activity that restricted United States exports.
In 1994, Congress once again refined the definition: Foreign government
acts, policies, or practices which deny fair and equitable 45 "market opportunities, including the toleration by a foreign government of systematic anticompetitive activities by enterprises or among enterprises in the
foreign country that have the effect of restricting, on a basis that is
inconsistent with commercial considerations, access of United States
'
goods or services to a foreign market . . ... .
With the expansion of the definition of unreasonableness, it becomes
clear that Congress intended private party anticompetitive conduct to be
actionable under Section 301." The Statement of Administrative Action reveals the process of implementation of the provision:
Among the foreign government practices that section 301(d)(3)(B) defines
as "unreasonable" are those that deny fair and equitable market opportunities, including the toleration by a foreign government of systematic

among competitors. But the "horizontal" keiretsu is not a grouping of competitors but rather a conglomeration of noncompeting entities from different sectors ....
Therefore, the structure of keiretsu does not appear to be subject to
legal attack under the Clayton Act.
Id. at 259. (footnotes omitted).
142. Id.
143. Shitekidookusen No Kinshi Oyobi Koseitorihiki No Kakuho Ni Kansura
Horitsu (Law to Prohibit Private Monopolization and to Maintain Fair Trade) Law
54, 1847, is the actual title of the Antimonopoly Law. Kodak Petition, supra note
115, at 186, n.431.
144. Trade Act of 1974, §301(d)(3)(A), 19 U.S.C. §2411(d)(3)(A).
145. Trade Act of 1974, §301(d)(3)(B)(i), 19 U.S.C. §2411(d)(3)(B)(i).
146. Trade Act of 1974, §301(d)(3)(B)(IV), 19 U.S.C. §2411(d)(3)(B)(IV).
147. Statement of Administrative Action, H.R. Doc., No. 103-316, 103d Cong., 2d
Sess. 656-896 (1994) [hereinafter SAA].
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anticompetitive activities. The Administration will enforce vigorously the
"toleration of. . . anticompetitive activities" provision in section 301
when appropriate to address foreign anticompetitive behavior. The practices covered by the provision include, but are not limited to, toleration of
cartel-type behavior to toleration of closed purchasing behavior.'"

This language expressly covers foreign government action that takes
the form of "toleration of cartel-type behavior to toleration of closed
purchasing behavior (including collusive coercion of distributors or customers) that precludes and limits U.S. access in a concerted and systematic way."'49 The question then becomes whether the Fuji distribution
system consists of anticompetitive practices. Only one party previously
filed a Section 301 petition solely against foreign anticompetitive practices." Another petition contained allegations of anticompetitive practices.'
The Japan Fair Trade Commission (JFTC) administers Japan's competition law, The Antimonopoly Act,' and prohibits three types of con148. Id. at 367, cited in Kodak Petition, supra note 115, at 185.
149. Id.

150. Japan Auto Parts (P-21), Office of the United States Trade Representative
Section 301 Table of Cases 3 (Apr. 1, 1994) (filed May 9, 1988; withdrawn June 30,
1994), cited in Smith, supra note 54, at 287, n.173. The case involved the sale of
spare automobile parts sold at higher prices to suppliers who were not the designated
car dealers of the Japanese manufacturers. Id. at 287.
151. Another case which alleged anticompetitive business practices was the
Japanese Semiconductor Case. Japan Semiconductors, 52 Fed. Reg. 43,146 (1987).
This hybrid case focused partly on strategic trade barriers in the Japanese semiconductor industry and on private barriers, even before Congress amended Section 301 to include the anticompetitive practices clause. Smith, supra note 54, at 288. In that case
the Japan Fair Trade Commission was allegedly lax in the enforcement of the Japanese Antimonoply Law with respect to cartels. Id. The investigation ultimately resulted
in an agreement between the two governments in 1991, which the Japanese Government indicated it will decline to renew in 1996. Hashimoto Says New U.S. Chip Pact
Is Unnecessary, Market Forces Working, 12 Int'l Trade Rept. (BNA) No. 42, at 1759

(Oct. 25, 1995). Japanese Minister for International Trade and Industry, Ryuttaro
Hashimoto said that "We believe the objectives of the agreement have already been
fulfilled. There is no need for a government-to-government arrangement. Our market
is already open." Id. This was in respect to Japan's position as to the renewal of the
1991 semiconductor, which is due for renewal in mid-1996. The agreement provided
that the U.S. semiconductor industry expected to capture a 20 percent market share of
the semiconductor industry in Japan by 1992, where the agreement added, however,
that the 20 percent goal was not a guarantee, a ceiling or a floor on market share.
Id. According to the U.S. government, for the second quarter of 1995, foreign industry enjoyed a 22.9 percent share of the Japanese semiconductor industry. Id.
152. See supra note 143 and accompanying text (providing the full name of the
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duct: private monopolization; unreasonable restraint of trade; and unfair
trade practices.'53 Section 2(9) of the Antimonopoly Act defines the
phrase "unfair trade practices" to mean anything "which tends to impede
fair competition .... 5"'
The JFTC sets forth a "General Designation
on Unfair Trade Practices" which lists 16 types of conduct that amount
to unfair trade practices. Kodak maintains that Fuji engages in several of
these unfair practices, including resale price maintenance,155 vertical
exclusive dealing (exclusive dealing arrangements, dealing on restrictive
terms, discriminatory treatment), refusal to deal (refusal to deal by a
single firm, concerted refusal to deal). 5 6 Assuming that Kodak could
prove such arrangements to exist in the Fuji distribution system, the
United States may appropriately use Section 301.
V. A MESSAGE TO THE PACIFIC RIM
"By all accounts Asia will be the most dynamic part of the world
economy in the next twenty years."' 57 One expert draws an analogy
between the United States' relationship today with the Pacific nations to
that of the British Empire's relationship to the United States and Germany during the end of the nineteenth century.'58 The fall in Great
Britain's status as the dominant force in world trade created pressure on
the British government to move away from free-trade principles to protectionism.'59 This "diminished giant syndrome"'" appears to the critics of Section 301 to be one of the statute's underlying policy bases.
Countries in the Eastern Pacific Rim, such as Japan, Korea, and Taiwan rely upon the imports of raw materials from the developing countries in Southeast Asia and upon the United States for the export of
their manufactured products. 6 '

Antimonopoly Act and its citation).
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. "Resale price maintenance is when the manufacturer's suggestion that economic disadvantage imposed on the distributor causes distributors to sell at the indicated prices." Kodak Petition, supra note 115, at 193-94. Kodak alleges that Fuji has
been successful in resale price maintenance with its tokuyakuten. Id.
156. Id. at 33-57, 184-205.
157. AN AMERtCAN TRADE STRATEGY, supra note 98, at 131.
158. Jagdish Bhagwati, Aggressive Unilateralism: An Overview, in AGGRESSIVE
UNLATERALISM, supra note 6, at 11-12
159. Id. at 12.
160. Id. at 11.
161. Robert E. Baldwin, Commentary, in AN AMERICAN TRADE STRATEGY, supra
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As such, access to the huge United States market endures as the
weapon within Section 301. The present pressure on the United States
Government to retaliate against foreign nations which engage in unfair
trade stems from several sources, including, the large trade deficits of
the 1980s and 1990s, the success of Japan and other rising industrial
countries in the United States market and third world markets in addition to concerns for the future competitiveness of American high-technology industries."
In pressuring Japan in cases such as Kodak, the United States sends a
message to the emerging economies of Asia and the Pacific Rim: Korea,
Thailand, India, Malaysia, Indonesia, Vietnam and China should follow
the free trading path rather than construct protectionist fences as their
economies develop. "Insofar as the Pacific Rim is concerned, U.S. interests lie in integrating the countries of the rim into the global trading
system and making them 63a force for constructing a stronger, more effective multilateral system.'
Japan-like barriers to trade could arise if any of these emerging economies attempt to nurture "infant" industries by means of domestic protection, by fashioning distribution systems which mirror those in Japan
and prevent fair competition from foreign enterprises. "The United States
cannot afford to wait that long. The trade pressures are too great, as are
the temptations for other nations to emulate Japan."''"
CONCLUSION
The United States remains justified in demanding that foreign markets
provide unfettered access to American exports, as long as the United
States maintains an open market to foreign competition." s Section 301
can be used "constructively," affording the United States with a vehicle
to bring trade barriers that do not fall within the WTO scheme to the
negotiating table." In negotiating the removal of such trade barriers,

note 98, at 201.
162. Bruce K. MacLaury, Foreword, in AN AMERICAN TRADE STRATEGY, supra
note 98, at vii.
163. Committee for Economic Development, BREAKNG NEv GROUND IN U.S.
TRADE PoLIcy: A STATEMNT BY THE RESEARCH AND PoLicY CoMrirTEE OF THE

10 (1991).
164. Garten, supra note 14, at 55.
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the objective remains liberalizing trade. When trade barriers fall, not just
Kodak or the United States enjoy the benefits, but the entire world on a
multilateral basis. 67
Many formidable barriers exist to trading with Japan.'" The Japanese Government continues to recognize industrial cartels, sanction
keiretsu, and tolerate anticompetitive practices in the distribution system. 69 While these practices may not amount to violations of United
States antitrust laws, the USTR may deem some "unreasonable" because
they constitute unfair trade practices under the Japanese Antimonopoly
Law. 7' If the Japan Fair Trade Commission will not address them,
Section 301 may remain the only way of subjecting the practices to
close scrutiny. The Kodak-Fuji dispute highlights private barriers to
trade which do not fall within the competence of the WTO.
Serious international legal considerations, however, constrain unilateral
action by the United States taken outside of the WTO scheme, to redress private trade barriers.' 7' The "most-favored nation" principle, a
central element of GATT law, persists as a particular concern." Fur-

167.
Identifying and dealing with nontraditional trade barriers establishes a precedent
on which multilateral law can build, just as the environmental and labor talks
with Mexico can be guideposts for the WTO, which is now taking up those
issues. Moreover, as Japan opens its market, every other country is eligible to
compete for the benefits. In other words, the United States and Japan negotiated
a bilateral agreement but the results were multilateralized. That is exactly what
happened with the agreement between the United States and China on intellectual property rights earlier this year. As soon as the ink dried, the agreement's
provisions became available to the EU, Japan, and all other comers.
Garten, supra note 14, at 56.
168. Thatcher, supra note 72, at 528. See Garten, supra note 14, at 55 (discussing
meetings between President Clinton and Prime Minister Koichi Miyazaui concerning
economic cooperation).
169. Id.
170. SAA, supra note 147, at 656-896.
171. See Smith, supra note 54, at 281-84 (discussing retaliation under Section 301
within the WTO).
172. Gantz, supra note 13, at 18-21. "The core principles of both GATT 1947
and GATT 1994 are unconditional "most-favored-nation" (MFN) treatment . . . . Under MFN, each member country automatically extends the benefits afforded to any
other member country to all WTO members." Id. at 20-21. Thus, if the United States
raised tariffs on certain Japanese products as permitted by Section 301 in retaliation
for the anticompetitive practices of Fuji, Japan would undoubtedly challenge the U.S.
action and take the case to the WTO, alleging violation of its MFN rights under
GATT 1994. Id. The U.S. would probably lose the case because the purported
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thermore, the United States invokes unilateral measures in too many
cases rather than taking the appropriate cases to the fledgling World
Trade Organization, the United States possibly sends the message that it
does not respect the very mechanism for trade unity which it helped to
establish. The United States must continue to embrace both a bilateral
and multilateral approach to trade problems."
Such approaches are not mutually exclusive and, in fact, are necessary
to confront the market access problems such as those that plague Kodak.
In addition, with 1996 as an election year, Presidential politics certainly
will play a role in how the Kodak-Fuji dispute evolves, with the likely
issues being United States sovereignty in the face of the WTO, the trade
deficit with Japan, and the unwillingness of the United States to cower
to Japan in trade disputes.
Unless and until the WTO expands its orbit to cover private barriers
to trade, United States manufacturers and producers must rely upon
Section 301, the only instrument capable of addressing these concerns.
As for the aspects of the Kodak Petition alleging anticompetitive practices in the Japanese distribution system, resort to the WTO becomes impossible. Bilateral negotiations with Japan, with the threat of Section
301 sanctions looming in the background, may help achieve the desired
results.
In the modem international trading arena, the use of tariffs and quotas
has steadily declined. In their place disguised barriers have emerged,
with effects far more pernicious than any overt restriction. As the era of
the WTO will see increased trade liberalization, it is also certain to see
reengineered and innovative forms of non-tariff barriers. Without Section
301 to address such barriers, trade liberalization becomes a meaningless
endeavor.

anticompetitive practices do not fall within the WVTO scheme. The case would then
require the U.S. to lower the tariffs it raised as to the Japanese products or increase
tariffs on like product imports from all countries, or face countermeasures from Japan

authorized by the WTO. Id.
173.
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EPILOGUE
At the time of publication of this paper, the Kodak-Fuji dispute has
evolved considerably. By the time this article appears in print, yet more
developments are certain. Nevertheless, the primary theme of this paper-that Section 301 can be used effectively to bring attention to, and
possibly combat, private party anticompetitive practices-has been validated by the USTR's determination following its investigation of trade
barriers in the Japanese film distribution system.
The USTR, for the first time, made its Section 301 determination of
unfair trade practices based upon the Japanese Government's "toleration"
of "systematic anticompetitive practices."' The USTR's office declared
that "[t]he government of Japan is responsible for creating substantial
barriers in the market and for supporting or tolerating actions by private
companies that reinforce those barriers."2
While the United States has reserved its right to retaliate under Section 301, it is currently pursuing a formal complaint under the auspices
of the World Trade Organization.3 In addition, at the behest of the
United States Government, Kodak has also submitted a case to the Japan Fair Trade Commission.' The JFTC has promised a full investigation.
On June 13, 1996, the USTR instituted formal dispute resolution
proceedings in the WTO against Japan in connection with trade barriers
to the Japanese film market.5 The WTO case has three central pillars
and the United States has requested consultations with Japan regarding
all three. First, the U.S. contends that Japan violated GATT Article IIn,
which requires that imported products receive national treatment, and
GATT Article X, which mandates transparency in the publication and

1. U.S. to Seek Resolution in WTO of Japan Film Market Complaint, INT'L
TRADE REP. (BNA) Vol. 13 at 1001-02 (June 19, 1996).
2. Id. at 1002.
3. See U.S. Launches Broad WTO Case Under GATT, GATS Against Japan on
Film, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, at 22 (June 14, 1996) (discussing elements of Kodak WTO
case).
4. See Kodak Submission May Prompt Full JFTC Investigation of Film Sector,
INSIDE U.S. TRADE, at 8 (June 21, 1996) (detailing Kodak decision to submit case to
JFTC).
5. U.S. Launches Broad WTO Case Under GATT, GATS Against Japan on Film,
INSIDE U.S. TRADE, at 22 (June 14, 1996).
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administration of trade laws and regulations.6 Also part of this pillar,
the U.S. maintains that Japan has nullified and impaired U.S. benefits
under GATT Article XXIII
The second pillar of the WTO case is buttressed by U.S. assertions
that Japan violated GATS Article m, which requires that all measures
affecting trade in services be transparent, and GATS Article XVI, the
most-favored nation provision which prevents members from adopting
trade restrictive measures! Finally, the third pillar was fashioned from a
1960 GATT Working Party Report, which addresses business practices
that restrict competition in international trade.9
The United States is confident that its case against Japan will succeed. It seems unlikely that the United States Government would have
initiated WTO dispute resolution proceedings had Kodak not filed a
Section 301 petition. Regardless of how the WTO case matures, or what
the JFTC declares following its investigation, Section 301 has demonstrated its utility in this case.
The USTR's determination of unfair trade practices in the Japanese
film market because of the Government of Japan's toleration of systematic anticompetitive practices has been put on record and Japan's unfair
trade practices are now subject to multilateral scrutiny. Should the WTO
proceedings, or the JFTC investigation, however, fail to temper the now
unmasked anticompetitive practices, Section 301 retaliatory measures sit
poised and ready to be implemented.

6.
7.
8.
9.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 23.
Id.

